Neoliberalism, governmentality, and ethnography: a rejoinder by Brady, Michelle
367	
 
 
© Michelle Brady 2015 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 20, pp. 367-371, December 2015 
 
EXCHANGES  
 
Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethnography: A rejoinder 
Michelle Brady, School of Social Science, University Of Queensland 
 
Mitchell Dean and I agree there is an important discussion to be had about Foucault and 
the social sciences. My recent article sought to advance this debate. Dean has responded 
because he views my article as an attack on his work. This interpretation is mistaken. 
My article is not focused on Dean’s work though, as he points out, it does make 
reference to what he has called his “very simplified framework” for engaging in an 
analytics of governmentality.1 My article seeks to explain the logics that underpin recent 
efforts to use ethnographic methods (broadly defined) together with an analytics of 
governmentality. The arguments that motivate these “ethnographic” works have been 
advanced by various scholars for a number of years. However, the visibility of these 
works has been reduced by the fact that they have been scattered across various social 
science disciplines. My article also locates these works within broader debates about 
governmentality studies, including common criticisms.  
In his response, Dean pursues four key criticisms of my article, suggesting that it: 
(1) makes an untenable claim that Foucault was a realist sociologist “seeking to access 
the complexity of everyday life”2; (2) claims ethnography has “special access to the real 
in the form of ‘actual people’”3; (3) accuses the governmentality literature of a tendency 
towards “cookie-cutter” analysis, but fails to name an author or work that displays this 
weakness; and (4) discusses what Dean has referred to as his “simplified framework” in 
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society4 but fails to consider his other works. I 
will address each of these points in turn.  
First, Dean devotes three pages to advancing the claim that my article argues that 
Foucault was a realist who addressed the “sociological reality of the singular ontological 
domain of practice”5 and who sought “to access the complexity of everyday life,”6 with 
																																								 																				
1 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Thousand Oaks, Calif, London: 
Sage Publications, 2010, 2nd ed.), 33. 
2 Mitchell Dean, “Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography: A Response to Michelle Brady,” 
Foucault Studies, vol. 20 (2015), 359.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Dean, Governmentality, 33. 
5 Dean, “Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography,” 359. 
6 Ibid. 
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the aim to generate “sociological description of practice or actual forms of 
‘governance’.”7 No one with a basic understanding of Foucault’s work would claim that 
he was a realist sociologist.8 It would be surprising then if experts in Foucault, including 
the editorial board at Foucault Studies and the article’s reviewers, did not raise objections 
to publishing such an obviously flawed argument. The link between my article’s text 
and the interpretation Dean compiles in his response is unclear because he does not 
systematically reference my text when advancing his reading of my argument. In the 
very few places where Dean does make direct reference to the text of my article he either 
misquotes it or paraphrases in such a way that my argument is radically changed. A 
particularly illuminating example is where Dean writes: 
They [ethnographies] will, unsettle the distinction between “studies of 
governmentalites and sociological studies of practice” (the latter is one word that 
does not get pluralized), by making us realize that we can only go beyond “a very 
thin sense of schemas [sic] for governing [sic]” by embracing an ethnographic 
methodology that can give us a ‘more finely grained picture’ of the problems these 
schemas were addressing.9  
The text Dean places in quotes does not match text that appears anywhere in my article 
and the argument that he summarizes bears little relation to the argument that appears 
on pages 27 and 28 of my article. On these pages I reflect on a specific case where 
“publically available sources, such as policy documents, promotional material, 
legislation and political speeches provided a very thin sense of the ‘schemas’ that 
governed single mothers subject to welfare reforms.”10 I argue that an ethnographic 
study of employment services for single parents subjected to Welfare to Work 
requirements provides new insights into ”the ‘schemas’”11 that governed single mothers 
by illuminating how these employment services understood the problems they “were 
seeking to respond to.”12 In other words, this ethnography enables us to understand 
how single mothers were “made subjects” by those responsible for delivering Welfare to 
Work services. In his response Dean paraphrases the article’s argument in a way that 
incorrectly reframes this study as a traditional realist ethnography that sought to 
document the objective problems that the employment providers aimed to remedy.  
Dean’s fundamental misreading of what is being argued here ties into his second 
objection to my article. Dean asserts that my article claims that ethnography has “special 
																																								 																				
7 Ibid. 
8	However, see Valverde’s argument that social scientists do commonly (and mistakenly) view 
Foucault’s key terms as sociological concepts rather than “tentative and dynamic abstractions” (Pat 
O’Malley and Mariana Valverde, “Foucault, Criminal Law, and the Governmentalization of the 
State,” in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law, ed. M. D. Dibber, 1st ed. (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), 331).	
9 Ibid., 358. 
10 Michelle Brady, “Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities: From the Neoliberal Apparatus to 
Neoliberalism and Governmental Assemblages,” Foucault Studies, no. 18 (2014), 28. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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access to the real in the form of ‘actual people’.”13 Again, it is unclear how Dean arrived 
at this interpretation. Is it based solely on my article, or does he also believe that the 
authors of the other articles in the special issue take this stance? This mistaken 
interpretation then leads Dean to devote many pages to explaining the fundamentals of 
Foucault’s position, including the idea that Foucault “locates himself in a nominalist, not 
a realist tradition,”14 that “Foucault is not a social scientist, a sociologist, or a social 
historian, and nor is he a political scientist studying governance,”15 and that Foucault is 
not addressing the “sociological reality of the singular ontological domain of practice”16 
but instead “how practices are interconnected with our production of such a knowledge 
of reality.”17 The scholars that produced the “ethnographic” studies that my article 
reviews would not disagree with these descriptions of Foucault’s position, and neither 
does my article. My article does argue that ethnographic methodologies (broadly 
understood) may allow us to see practices, sites, and problems that would otherwise not 
be visible. Collier, who is quoted in my article, puts this eloquently when he says: 
The detailed engagement of ethnography provided, thus, an orientation to a grouping 
of sites and a set of problems that I simply could not have stumbled upon otherwise.18 
As Collier has explained in more recent articles, the argument that fieldwork has these 
benefits does not amount to what Dean calls “epistemological imperialism.”19 Instead, 
what is being claimed is that fieldwork provides an orientation that is otherwise not 
possible. Such a claim does not involve asserting that fieldwork gives “any epistemic 
privilege.”20 
Third, Dean objects to my argument that the governmentality literature has a 
tendency to produce “cookie-cutter” descriptions of neoliberal rationalities and 
practices. Dean protests that there is no evidence of a “cookie-cutter” tendency in the 
literature, and implies that my argument is entirely original and controversial when he 
writes: 
On reading this, the reader would be understandably concerned and search the paper 
for the sources of this tendency in the governmentality literature […] but over 
																																								 																				
13 Dean, “Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography,” 359.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Stephen Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 29. 
19 Dean, “Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography,” 360. 
20 Stephen Collier, Fieldwork as Technique for Generating what Kind of Surprise? Thoughts on Post-Soviet 
Social in Light of ‘Fieldwork/Research’ (University of California, Irvine, Department of Anthropology, 
November 2013), 14.  
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twenty-two pages and 135 footnotes I could not find a single article that is directly 
cited as a case of producing such descriptions.21 
My suggestion that there is such a tendency is far from original. One of the sources I cite 
in support of this critique is Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde’s highly 
influential 2006 article entitled “Governmentality.” This article openly states that there is 
a practice of “cookie-cutter typification or explanation”22 within studies of 
governmentality. Specifically they write: 
If one of the attractions of governmentality has been its capacity to render 
neoliberalism visible in new ways […] a marked tendency has been to regard it as a 
more or less constant master category that can be used both to understand and to 
explain all manner of political programs across a wide variety of settings […]  [and 
this practice] readily lends itself to a kind of cookie-cutter typification or explanation, 
a tendency to identify any program with neo-liberal elements as essentially neo-
liberal, and to proceed as if this subsumption of the particular under a more general 
category provides a sufficient account of its nature or explanation of its existence.23 
In a more recent article, Valverde has repeated this critique arguing that “the 
‘governmentality literature’ certainly prospered for a decade or so, and much of this did 
indeed turn ‘governmentality’ into another conceptual cookie-cutter.”24 Similarly, in 
their introduction to Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges Bröckling, 
Krasmann, and Lemke complain of various tendencies in “studies of governmentality” 
and they include the claim that “in increasingly small-format empirical studies they 
distil the always identical rationalities, strategies, and technologies of neoliberalism.”25 
In summary, it would not have been productive for me to give examples of authors who 
exhibited this tendency in a context where many of the leading theorists in this area 
have already critiqued the literature for exhibiting these flaws. Thus my claim is not 
original.   
Finally, Dean objects to my statement that his self-described “simplified 
framework” in Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society encourages “a focus on 
a discrete governmental rationality or ‘way of governing’.”26 Dean objects to this 
statement on the grounds that his Governmentality book points out that Foucault’s works 
“alert us to the fact that there is more than one type of neoliberalism.”27 Here Dean 
reframes what I am actually arguing into an entirely different argument. My argument 
																																								 																				
21 Dean, “Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography,” 360. 
22 Nikolas Rose, P. O'Malley and M. Valverde, “Governmentality,” Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, vol. 2 (2006), 97. 
23 Ibid, 97-8.  
24  Mariana Valverde, “Beyond Discipline and Punish: Foucault's Challenge to Criminology,” Carceral 
Notebooks, vol. 4 (2008), 206.  
25 U. Bröckling, S. Krasmann and T. Lemke (eds.), Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2011, 1st ed.), 16. 
26 Dean, Governmentality, 33. 
27 Ibid., 362.  
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was not that Dean does not recognize more than one type of neoliberalism, but simply 
that if one answers the four sets of questions which he lays out in Governmentality they 
will tend to focus on a discrete governmental rationality and associated technologies. In 
contrast, one could ask these questions in a way that encouraged a focus on 
assemblages. Valverde has recently posed a set of five questions that do just that. Rather 
than asking about “specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of 
particular types of practical rationality (‘expertise’ and ‘know-how’) and relying upon 
definite mechanisms, techniques and technologies”28 she asks “What are the techniques 
used to build the governing assemblage in question, including legal forms such as the 
contract?  Were these techniques borrowed and repurposed, and if so, what kinds of 
governing effects trail in their wake?”29 In my article I am careful to point out that 
Dean’s framework in Governmentality does not ”explicitly preclude the possibility of 
multiple, overlapping forms of power and political rationalities”30 and I never claim that 
Dean does not recognize that there is “more than one type of neoliberalism.”31 However, 
in reading Dean’s response I see that I could have been more careful not to associate his 
work as a whole with problematic tendencies within the literature. 
In the closing pages of his response Dean writes “What then can ethnography do 
and what can it not do? Brady cites many excellent studies with intricate and subtle 
analyses.”32 Unfortunately Dean’s response devotes absolutely no space to explaining 
what he views as excellent about the studies that I review. Beginning with these 
strengths might have been a better place for starting the necessary discussion about 
Foucault and the social sciences.     
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